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Abstract 
 
Poor cash flow leads to insolvency of the firm. One of the most important factors that lead to poor cash 
flow is the inefficiency of working capital management. This study investigates relationships between 
promoter ownership and working capital management efficiency of Indian manufacturing firms. A 
sample of 151 manufacturing firms was selected from Top 500 Companies listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) for a period of five years (from 2010-2014). Results indicate that changes in promoter 
ownership play a role in changing working capital management efficiency of Indian manufacturing 
firms by reducing their cash conversion cycle and by improving cash conversion efficiency. This study 
contributes to the literature on the factors that cause changes in working capital management 
efficiency. The findings may be useful for financial managers, operations managers, investors, 
financial management consultants, and other stakeholders.   
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1 Introduction 
 
It is commonly agreed that poor cash flow leads to 
insolvency of the firm (Sharma, 2001; Hoque, 
Bhandari, Iyer, 2013). One of the important factors 
that lead to poor cash flow is the inefficiency of 
working capital management; that is, the longer the 
cash flow cycle, the poorer the cash inflow. Therefore, 
this study concentrated on the relationship between 
promoter ownership and the efficiency of working 
capital management by collecting data from Indian 
production firms.  
There are three types of shareholders in the 
Indian listed firms: promoter shareholders, non-
promoter shareholder institutions, and the general 
public. Firms operated by families are characterized as 
having concentrated ownership called promoters. 
Most of the shares are held by the ‗promoter‘ -- the 
entity with controlling stakes in the company and its 
associates. The ownership of these family firms is 
frequently associated with pyramiding, cross holding, 
and family trusts. The non-promoter shareholders 
include banks, financial institutions, and mutual fund 
companies (Chakraborthy et al., 2008). According to 
Kumar and Singh (2013), promoters are a group of 
persons who are involved in the incorporation and 
organization of a corporation. They are an important 
part of companies in the Indian business context, as 
most of the companies are of family origin. Thus, a 
majority of the promoters belong to the same families, 
relatives, and in some cases, friends. The agency 
problem under the governance of promoters is low 
because a majority of the shareholders is from the 
same family and from relatives (Schulze et al., 2003).  
The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), which focused on the function of the board, 
serves as the basic foundation of the structure of the 
board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Based on agency theory, agency 
conflict (i.e., conflict between principal and agent) 
takes place in corporations because managers may not 
work in the best interests of shareholders to make 
‗corporate assets‘ productive and to maximize 
shareholders‘ wealth.    
The board of directors goes in the hands of 
majority vote holders and they control the corporation 
by formulating new policies and by amending existing 
corporate policies including policies related working 
capital management.  
According to Owens (2010), majority holdings 
occur when one party has more than 51% of the equity 
of the firm and the other partners have less than 49%. 
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Once board of directors changes, the policies of the 
corporation including working capital management 
may also change. The board of directors formulates 
corporate policies that affect the efficiency of working 
capital management. The components of working 
capital management include receivables, inventory, 
payables, and using cash efficiently for day-to-day 
operations (Gill and Biger, 2013). Since a majority of 
the shares in the hands of promoters belongs to family 
members and relatives, the board of directors formed 
by promoters can function better to improve working 
capital efficiency. This leads to the following research 
question: 
 
1.1 Do changes in promoter ownership 
impact working capital management 
efficiency? 
 
Although all the components of working capital 
efficiency such as accounts receivables, accounts 
payable, inventory, and the cash conversion cycle are 
important, cash held for the purpose of investment in 
physical assets, precautionary (i.e., safety reasons to 
protect firm from unforeseen fluctuations), speculative 
(i.e., to take advantages of any bargain purchases that 
may arise), and transactional motives (i.e., everyday 
transactions) is most vulnerable to wanton behavior by 
management (Besley and Brigham, 2005; Isshaq et al., 
2009; Gill and Biger, 2013) and it leads to poor 
governance of the corporation.  
Idle cash leads to opportunity cost of capital. 
According to the pecking order theory of Myers 
(1984), firms prefer to finance investments first with 
retained earnings or internal equity (i.e., cash 
available), then with safe debt and then risky debt, and 
finally with external equity in order to minimize 
asymmetric information costs and other financing 
costs. Since the board of directors formulate important 
corporate governance policies, it is responsible for the 
control of high cash balances, high volume of 
accounts receivable, high amounts of accounts 
payable, and a fast cash conversion cycle (Gill and 
Biger, 2013, p. 117). Therefore, it is expected that 
positive changes in promoter ownership cause 
favorable changes in working capital management 
efficiency.   
Although many studies in the area of working 
capital management have been conducted since Nadiri 
(1969) pioneered a study on the desired level of real 
cash balances, no published studies were found that 
investigated the impact of promoter ownership on 
working capital management efficiency. However, 
notable previous studies emphasized the relationships 
between:   
 Production output and cash balances (Nadiri, 
1969). 
 Cash balances and easiness of borrowing 
(Dittmar et al., 2003). 
 Leverage, firm size, and cash levels (Saddour, 
2006). 
 Corporate governance and cash holdings 
(Drobetz and Gruninger, 2007). 
 Sales growth and corporate liquidity (Gill and 
Mathur, 2011). 
 Corporate governance and cash policy (Kuan et 
al., 2011; Lau and Block, 2012). 
 Corporate governance and working capital 
management efficiency (Gill and Biger, 2013).  
The present study extends the above studies by 
testing the relationship between promoter ownership 
and working capital management efficiency of Indian 
manufacturing firms. This research study proposes 
that promoter ownership has a strong impact on 
working capital management efficiency. This is 
because the board of directors formed by promoters is 
generally controlled by family members and their 
relatives and they are expected to improve working 
capital management efficiency by playing a better 
stewardship role. Thus, this study adds empirical 
substance to existing theory.  
The organization of the remainder of the paper is 
as follows. Section two examines the previous 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section three 
describes the data and methodology used to 
investigate our research question. Section four 
discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section 
five concludes and considers the implications of the 
findings. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Stewardship theory of Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
indicates that the main role of the board of directors is 
to advise and support management by acting as 
stewards, rather than to discipline and monitor as 
agency theory prescribes, and align the interest of 
employees with corporate objectives to maximize 
shareholders‘ wealth (Davis et al., 1997; Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004; Pieper et al., 2008; Arosa, Iturralde and 
Maseda, 2010).    
Among all working capital items, the asset with 
the most liquidity is cash and it is one measure of a 
corporation‘s ability to pay its short-term liabilities, as 
they are due. However holding higher cash balances 
does not maximize shareholders‘ wealth or returns and 
may lead to agency problems. Therefore, an optimal 
cash policy is necessary to maximize shareholders‘ 
wealth and to avoid underpricing issues (Cossin and 
Hricko, 2004). Strong corporate governance is 
required to control cash and other components of 
working capital. Although firms require cash for the 
growth of production by increasing inventories 
(Michalski, 2008) to smooth operations, a higher level 
of inventory and cash can begin to backfire. Paying 
accounts payable after the due date also hurts the firm 
because of the penalty charged by suppliers. Building 
unnecessary working capital also does not benefit the 
firm because it has a negative impact on shareholders‘ 
wealth. Therefore, an optimal working capital 
management policy is necessary for the firm (Gill and 
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Biger, 2013). The agency problem is low in the family 
controlled firms; that is, the board of directors formed 
by promoters can be useful in improving the 
efficiency of working capital management and in 
maximizing shareholders wealth. 
The CEO, together with the board of directors, 
formulates policies, including those related to working 
capital management. According to Yermack (1996) 
and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), a small board of 
directors is more effective in the decision-making 
process than a larger board of directors. According to 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), small board sizes should 
be encouraged to promote effective communication 
and decision-making. Jensen (1993) indicated that a 
lack of independent leadership creates difficulty for 
boards to respond to failure in top management. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) also argued that concentration of 
decision management and decision control in one 
individual hinders boards‘ effectiveness in monitoring 
top management.  
The empirical studies on working capital 
management are as follows. 
Nadiri (1969) pioneered the study on working 
capital management efficiency by building a model on 
optimal cash holdings and found that the demand for 
real cash balances is determined by the firm‘s output. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) found that cash holdings 
double up in countries where the rights of 
shareholders are not well protected. The authors also 
found that when shareholder protection is poor, factors 
such as investment opportunities and asymmetric 
information become less important and firms hold 
larger cash balances when access to funds is easier. 
These findings suggest that agency problems are 
important determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
Therefore, strong corporate governance is necessary. 
The board of directors formed by promoters can be 
more successful in minimizing agency problems and, 
consequently, improving the efficiency of working 
capital management. 
Saddour (2006), using tradeoff theory and 
pecking order theory, sampled 297 French firms and 
found that growth companies hold higher cash levels 
than mature companies.  
Kuan et al., (2011) found that the impact of 
corporate governance differs between family-
controlled and nonfamily-controlled firms. The 
authors also found that the separation of seat control 
rights and cash flow rights significantly affects the 
cash policy within different levels of cash holdings in 
firms. 
Lau and Block (2012) found that founder firms 
hold a significantly higher level of cash than family 
firms. In addition, they found a positive interaction 
effect between founder management and cash 
holdings on firm value, suggesting that the presence of 
founders as managers helps to mitigate the agency 
costs of cash holdings. 
Gill and Biger (2013) found that corporate 
governance plays some role in improving the 
efficiency of working capital management. 
Ding, Guariglia, and Knight (2013) used Chinese 
companies‘ data and found that firms characterized by 
high working capital display high sensitivities of 
investment in working capital to cash flow. Therefore, 
an optimal level of working capital is required to 
improve the efficiency of working capital 
management.  
Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel, and Martínez-
Solano (2014) found the optimal level of investment 
in working capital balances, costs and benefits related 
to working capital management. The optimal level of 
investment decisions, however, are made by the board 
of directors and CEO. 
In summary, the limited availability of literature 
indicates that promoter ownership influences the 
efficiency of working capital management. Since 
promoters belong to the same family, relatives, and 
their friends, the board formed by promoters is 
expected to improve the efficiency of working capital 
management. Hence following hypotheses:  
H1: Changes in promoter ownership change cash 
holdings. 
H2: Changes in promoter ownership change 
current ratio. 
H3: Changes in promoter ownership change 
accounts receivables. 
H4: Changes in promoter ownership change 
inventory holdings. 
H5: Changes in promoter ownership change 
accounts payables. 
H6: Changes in promoter ownership change cash 
conversion cycle. 
H7: Changes in promoter ownership change cash 
conversion efficiency. 
 
3 Methods 
 
The study applied co-relational and non-experimental 
research design. This process of measurement is 
central to quantitative research because it provides the 
fundamental connection between empirical 
observation and mathematical expression of 
quantitative relationships. There is no single measure 
that fully expresses the efficiency of working capital 
management (Gill and Biger, 2013). We, therefore, 
chose seven different component measures of working 
capital management efficiency described in table 1. 
 
3.1 Measurement 
 
To remain consistent with previous studies, all the 
measures were adopted from the Gill and Biger (2013) 
study. 
Table 1 shows the measurements of the 
dependent, independent, and control variables that 
were used in regression analysis. 
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Table 1. Proxy Variables and their Measurements 
 
Dependent Variables Measurement 
Change in Cash Holdings (∆CHi,t) (Current year CH - Previous year CH)/Previous year CH 
Change in Current Ratio (∆CRi,t) (Current year CR - Previous year CR)/Previous year CR 
Change in Accounts Receivables (∆ARi,t)  (Current year AR - Previous year AR)/Previous year AR 
Change in Inventory (∆INVi,t) (Current year INV - Previous year INV)/Previous year INV 
Change in Accounts Payables (∆APi,t) (Current year AP - Previous year AP)/Previous year AP 
Change in Cash Conversion Cycle (∆CCCi,t) (Current year CCC - Previous year CCC)/Previous year CCC 
Change in Cash Conversion Efficiency (∆CCEi,t) (Current year CCE - Previous year CCE)/Previous year CCE 
Independent (explanatory) Variables Measurement 
Change in Promoter Ownership (∆POi,t) (Current year PO - Previous year PO)/Previous year PO 
Control Variables Measurement 
Change in Sales Growth (∆SGi,t)  (Current year sales - Previous year sales)/Previous year sales  
Change in Firm Size (∆FSi,t) (Current year FS - Previous year FS)/Previous year FS 
Change in Firm Performance (∆FPi,t)  (Current year FP - Previous year FP)/Previous year FP 
Notes:  
 Cash holdings = Log of average cash 
 Current ratio = Current assets/current liabilities 
 Accounts receivables = (Accounts receivables/sales)/365 days 
 Inventory = (Inventory/cost of goods sold)/365 days 
 Accounts payables = (Accounts payables/cost of goods sold)/365 days 
 Cash conversion cycle = No. of days A/R + no. of days inventory - no. of days A/P 
 Cash conversion efficiency = Cash flow from operations/sales 
 Sales growth = (Current year sales - previous year sales)/previous year sales 
 Firm size = Natural log (ln) of average assets 
 Firm performance = Net income after tax/revenue 
 
The regression models used in this study are as 
follows: 
 
∆CH = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (1) 
 
∆CR = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (2) 
 
∆AR = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (3) 
 
∆INV = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (4) 
 
∆AP = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (5) 
 
∆CCC = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (6) 
 
∆CCE = ∆ + ∆1∆POit + ∆2∆SGit + ∆3∆FSit + ∆4∆FPit + μit (7) 
 
In the above models, i refers to the individual 
firm, t refers to a specified time period, and μi,t refers 
to the error term. 
In the estimated models, α measures the 
magnitude at which changes in promoter ownership 
changes the working capital management efficiency. 
We extend the above models by considering a set of 
control variables (SG, FS, and FP). We estimate the 
coefficients of variables of models by applying the 
weighted least squares (WLS) method. 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
A database was built from a selection of 500 financial 
reports from Top 500 Publicly Traded Companies 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) between 
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2014 to collect a 
sample of Indian manufacturing firms. Out of 
approximately 500 financial reports announced by 
Top 500 Publicly Traded Companies between January 
1, 2010 and December 31, 2014, only 151 financial 
reports were usable. Cross sectional yearly data was 
used in this study. Thus, 151 financial reports resulted 
in 755 total observations. The sample included 
manufacturing firms that manufactured and processed 
products for the following sectors:   
 Industrial equipment (40 firms).  
 Materials (74 firms). 
 Energy (25 firms). 
 Utilities (12 firms).   
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3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the collected 
variables. The explanation on descriptive statistics is 
as follows: 
 Accounts receivables: ∆AR12 = 7%; ∆AR13 = 
8%; ∆AR14 = -1%. 
 Inventory: ∆INV12 = -1%; ∆INV13 = -4%; 
∆INV14 = -2%. 
 Accounts payables: ∆AP12 = -1%; ∆AP13 = -
1%; ∆AP14 = 4%. 
 Cash conversion cycle: ∆CCC12 = -12%; 
∆CCC13 = -7%; ∆CCC14 = -5%. 
 Cash holdings: ∆CH12 = 5%; ∆CH13 = -1%; 
∆CH14 = 2%. 
 Current ratio: ∆CR12 = -3%; ∆CR13 = 2%; 
∆CR14 = -1%. 
 Cash conversion efficiency: ∆CCE12 = -11%; 
∆CCE13 = -8%; ∆CCE14 = -3%.  
 Promoter ownership: ∆PO11 = 1%; ∆PO12 = 
2%; ∆PO13 = 1%. 
 Sales growth: ∆SG11 = 15%; ∆SG12 = 20%; 
∆SG13 = 8%. 
 Firm size: ∆FS11 = 2%; ∆FS12 = 1%; ∆FS13 = 
2%. 
 Firm performance: ∆FP11 = -6%; ∆FP12 = -
9%; ∆FP13 = -6%. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
∆AR12 -0.82 0.96 0.07 0.27 
∆AR13 -0.53 0.94 0.08 0.27 
∆AR14 -0.77 0.87 -0.01 0.25 
∆INV12 -0.75 0.87 -0.01 0.23 
∆INV13 -0.77 0.98 -0.04 0.25 
∆INV14 -0.99 0.94 -0.02 0.25 
∆AP12 -0.84 0.90 -0.01 0.28 
∆AP13 -0.80 0.93 -0.01 0.28 
∆AP14 -0.74 0.99 0.04 0.25 
∆CCC12 -0.96 0.99 -0.12 0.42 
∆CCC13 -0.98 0.92 -0.07 0.40 
∆CCC14 -0.99 0.98 -0.05 0.42 
∆CH12 -0.42 0.74 0.05 0.17 
∆CH13 -0.57 0.40 -0.01 0.13 
∆CH14 -0.59 0.80 0.02 0.18 
∆CR12 -0.96 0.90 -0.03 0.32 
∆CR13 -0.84 0.96 0.02 0.26 
∆CR14 -0.90 0.99 -0.01 0.24 
∆CCE12 -0.96 0.97 -0.11 0.46 
∆CCE13 -0.99 0.88 -0.08 0.41 
∆CCE14 -0.98 0.91 -0.03 0.50 
∆PO11 -0.51 0.44 0.01 0.08 
∆PO12 -0.13 0.51 0.02 0.06 
∆PO13 -0.40 0.52 0.01 0.08 
∆SG11 -0.66 0.93 0.15 0.22 
∆SG12 -0.82 0.98 0.20 0.22 
∆SG13 -0.89 0.91 0.08 0.22 
∆FS11 -0.02 0.76 0.02 0.07 
∆FS12 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 
∆FS13 -0.03 0.43 0.02 0.04 
∆FP11 -0.98 0.93 -0.06 0.36 
∆FP12 -0.91 0.95 -0.09 0.38 
∆FP13 -0.95 0.95 -0.06 0.36 
Notes: Variables include changes in accounts receivables (∆FP), inventory (∆INV), accounts payables 
(∆AP), cash conversion cycle (∆CCC), cash holdings (∆CH), cash conversion efficiency (∆CCE), promoter 
ownership (∆PO), sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and firm performance (∆FP).  
 
3.4 Pearson bivariate correlation 
analysis  
 
Bivariate correlation analysis shows that: 
 ∆AR12 is negatively correlated with ∆SG11. 
 INV13 is negatively correlated with ∆SG12.   
 ∆AP12 is negatively correlated with ∆SG11; 
∆AP13 is positively correlated with ∆SG12; and 
∆AP14 is negatively correlated with ∆SG13.  
 ∆CCC12 is negatively correlated with ∆PO11 
and ∆CCC13 is negatively correlated with ∆PO12. 
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 ∆CH12 is positively correlated with ∆FS11; 
∆CH13 is negatively correlated with ∆PO12; and 
∆CH14 is negatively correlated with ∆PO13 and 
∆SG13.   
 ∆CR12 is negatively correlated with ∆PO11 
and positively correlated with ∆SG11. 
 ∆CCE14 is positively correlated with ∆PO13 
and ∆SG13 (see Table 3).     
 
Table 3. Pearson correlations 
 
Variables ∆AR12 ∆INV12 ∆AP12 ∆CCC12 ∆CH12 ∆CR12 ∆CCE12 ∆PO11 ∆SG11 ∆FS11 ∆FP11 
∆AR12 1           
∆INV12 0.174** 1          
∆AP12 0.210*** 0.150 1         
∆CCC12 0.213*** 0.039 0.211*** 1        
∆CH12 -0.001 -0.184** -0.014 -0.092 1       
∆CR12 0.003 -0.049 -0.248*** 0.118 0.201** 1      
∆CCE12 -0.069 -0.080 0.181** -0.043 -0.018 -0.032 1     
∆PO11 -0.007 0.046 0.094 -0.181** 0.020 -0.230*** 0.141 1    
∆SG11 -0.210*** -0.030 -0.214*** -0.068 0.017 0.246*** -0.026 0.018 1   
∆FS11 0.036 -0.062 -0.098 -0.004 0.193** -0.023 -0.121 -0.264*** -0.207** 1  
∆FP11 0.087 0.096 0.106 0.017 -0.060 0.097 -0.078 -0.133 -0.085 -0.141 1 
            
Variables ∆AR13 ∆INV13 ∆AP13 ∆CCC13 ∆CH13 ∆CR13 ∆CCE13 ∆PO12 ∆SG12 ∆FS12 ∆FP12 
∆AR13 1           
∆INV13 -0.062 1          
∆AP13 0.174** 0.059 1         
∆CCC13 0.084 0.004 0.281*** 1        
∆CH13 -0.147 -0.080 0.023 -0.019 1       
∆CR13 -0.083 0.048 -0.252*** 0.009 .092 1      
∆CCE13 -0.096 0.004 0.162** 0.005 .179** -0.118 1     
∆PO12 0.138 -0.001 -0.031 -0.189** -.168** 0.067 0.024 1    
∆SG12 0.082 -0.176** 0.175** 0.060 -.068 -0.043 0.108 0.206** 1   
∆FS12 -0.115 0.005 0.001 0.064 .070 0.015 0.070 -0.036 0.285*** 1   
∆FP12 -0.098 0.038 -0.022 -0.052 .073 -0.015 0.044 -0.019 -0.279*** -0.057 1 
            
Variables ∆AR14 ∆INV14 ∆AP14 ∆CCC14 ∆CH14 ∆CR14 ∆CCE14 ∆PO13 ∆SG13 ∆FS13 ∆FP13 
∆AR14 1           
∆INV14 0.062 1          
∆AP14 0.234*** 0.226*** 1         
∆CCC14 0.022 0.049 0.175** 1        
∆CH14 0.056 -0.047 0.169** 0.068 1       
∆CR14 0.122 -0.075 -0.079 -0.004 0.071 1      
∆CCE14 0.094 0.050 0.068 -0.115 -0.028 -0.009 1     
∆PO13 0.104 0.124 -0.010 -0.159 -0.175** 0.002 0.188** 1    
∆SG13 0.075 0.076 -0.208** 0.108 -0.237*** -0.076 0.227*** 0.121 1   
∆FS13 -0.107 0.001 0.047 0.056 -0.086 -0.045 -0.076 -0.017 0.023 1  
Notes: Variables include changes in accounts receivables (∆AR), inventory (∆INV), accounts payables 
(∆AP), cash conversion cycle (∆CCC), cash holdings (∆CH), cash conversion efficiency (∆CCE), promoter 
ownership (∆PO), sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and firm performance (∆FP). ***, ** and * imply 
significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
4 Analysis and discussion 
 
In this section we present the empirical findings on the 
relationship between promoter ownership and working 
capital management efficiency of the Indian 
manufacturing firms. To counter problem of 
heteroskedasticity (changing variation after short 
period of time), we used the weighted least square 
(WLS) model with cross section weight of four 
industries (industrial equipment manufacturing, 
material production, energy production, and utilities 
products manufacturing). There was also possibility of 
endogeneity issues because we used multiple 
regression analysis. The issues of endogeneity also 
take place if certain variables are omitted and there are 
measurement errors. To minimize endogeneity issues, 
the most important variables that impact the working 
capital management efficiency were used and the 
measurements were borrowed from the previous 
empirical studies. As the sample of companies only 
included companies that ―survived‖ during the study 
period, there might have been a survival bias in the 
study (Gill and Biger, 2013, p. 124). 
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4.1 Promoter ownership, cash holdings, 
and current ratio 
 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equations 
1 and 2. Negative relationships between: 
 ∆PO12 and ∆CH13 and ∆PO13 and ∆CH14 
indicate that changes in promoter ownership reduce 
cash holdings in the Indian manufacturing firms. 
 ∆SG13 and ∆CH14 indicate that changes in 
sales growth reduce current ratio. 
 ∆PO11 and ∆CR12 indicate that changes in 
promoter ownership reduce current ratio. 
Positive relationships between ∆FS11 and 
∆CH12 indicate that changes in firm size increase 
cash holding in Indian production firms. 
 
Table 4. WLS regression – promoter ownership, cash holdings, and current ratio 
 
Variables ∆CH12 ∆CH12 ∆CH13 ∆CH13 ∆CH14 ∆CH14 ∆CR12 ∆CR12 ∆CR13 ∆CR13 ∆CR14 ∆CR14 
∆PO11 0.163 0.320 - - - - -0.740** -0.684** - - - - 
 (0.89) (1.70) - - - - (-2.17) (-1.99) - - - - 
∆SG11 - 0.057 - - - - - 0.438*** - - - - 
 - (0.90) - - - - - (3.75) - - - - 
∆FS11 - 0.898** - - - - - 0.278 - - - - 
 - (2.91) - - - - - (0.49) - - - - 
∆FP11 - 0.030 - - - - - 0.050 - - - - 
 - (0.73) - - - - - (0.67) - - - - 
∆PO12 - - -0.407*** -0.413** - - - - 0.382 0.467 - - 
 - - (-2.77) (-2.71) - - - - (1.24) (1.47) - - 
∆SG12 - - - 0.021 - - - - - -0.125 - - 
 - - - (0.42) - - - - - (-1.19) - - 
∆FS12 - - - 0.400 - - - - - -0.223 - - 
 - - - (0.51) - - - - - (-0.14) - - 
∆FP12 - - - 0.021 - - - - - 0.030 - - 
 - - - (0.77) - - - - - (0.52) - - 
∆PO13 - - - - -0.440*** -0.377* - - - - 0.003 -0.013 
 - - - - (-2.14) (-1.88) - - - - (0.01) (-0.05) 
∆SG13 - - - - - -0.175** - - - - - -0.048 
 - - - - - (-2.75) - - - - - (-0.62) 
∆FS13 - - - - - -1.519 - - - - - -1.317 
 - - - - - (-1.61) - - - - - (-1.14) 
∆FP13 - - - - - -0.057 - - - - - 0.074 
 - - - - - (-1.37) - - - - - (1.47) 
Constant 0.046** 0.020 -0.011 -0.019 0.021 0.049** -0.013 -0.093** 0.020 0.049 -0.028 0.001 
 (3.27) (1.05) (-1.02) (-1.10) (1.36) (2.51) (-0.50) (-2.68) (0.93) (1.39) (-1.50) (-0.05) 
Obs 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
χ2-test 0.80 2.37* 7.66** 2.12* 4.60** 4.28** 4.72** 4.82** 0.153 0.94 0.000 1.18 
R2 0.006 0.066 0.051 0.057 0.031 0.108 0.034 0.127 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.032 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.038 0.044 0.030 0.024 0.083 0.026 0.100 0.004 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 
Notes: In the Weighted Least Square Regression (WLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in 
cash holdings (∆CH) and changes in current ratio (∆CR). Independent variable is changes in promoter ownership 
(∆PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and firm performance 
(∆FP). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
4.2 Promoter ownership, accounts 
receivables, and inventory 
 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of Equations 
3 and 4. Negative relationships between: 
 ∆SG11 and ∆AR12 indicate that changes in 
sales growth reduce accounts receivables. 
 ∆FS12 and ∆AR13, and ∆FS13 and ∆AR14 
indicate that changes in firm size decrease accounts 
receivables in production firms.  
 ∆SG12 and ∆INV13 indicate that changes in 
sales growth reduce inventory level of production 
firms. 
Positive relationships between: 
 ∆PO13 and ∆AR14 indicate that changes in 
promoter ownership increase accounts receivables. 
 SG13 and ∆INV14 indicate that changes in 
sales growth increase inventory level of production 
firms. 
 FP13 and ∆INV14 indicate that changes in firm 
performance increase inventory level of production 
firms. 
 
4.3 Impact of promoter ownership on 
accounts payables and cash conversion 
cycle 
 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of Equations 
5 and 6. Negative relationships between: 
 ∆SG11 and ∆AP12 indicate that changes in 
sales growth reduce accounts payables. 
 ∆PO11 and ∆CCC12; ∆PO12 and ∆CCC13; 
and ∆PO13 and ∆CCC14 indicate that changes in 
promoter ownership reduce cash conversion cycle of 
Indian production firms. 
 ∆FS13 and ∆CCC14 indicate that changes in 
firm size reduce cash conversion cycle of Indian 
production firms.  
Positive relationships between ∆SG12 and 
∆AP13 indicate that changes in sales growth increase 
accounts payables. 
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Table 5. WLS regression – promoter ownership, accounts receivables, and inventory 
 
Variables ∆AR12 ∆AR12 ∆AR13 ∆AR13 ∆AR14 ∆AR14 ∆INV12 ∆INV12 ∆INV13 ∆INV13 ∆INV14 ∆INV14 
∆PO11 -0.122 -0.074 - - - - 0.011 -0.074 - - - - 
 (-0.40) (-0.23) - - - - (0.05) (-0.29) - - - - 
∆SG11 - -0.222** - - - - - -0.070 - - - - 
 - (-2.06) - - - - - (-0.81) - - - - 
∆FS11 - 0.024 - - - - - -0.530 - - - - 
 - (0.05) - - - - - (-1.30) - - - - 
∆FP11 - 0.085 - - - - - -0.003 - - - - 
 - (1.23) - - - - - (-0.06) - - - - 
∆PO12 - - 0.401 0.298 - - - - -0.119 0.088 - - 
 - - (1.16) (0.843) - - - - (-0.39) (2.85) - - 
∆SG12 - - - 0.068 - - - - - -2.60** - - 
 - - - (0.581) - - - - - (-2.58) - - 
∆FS12 - - - -3.441* - - - - - 2.358 - - 
 - - - (-1.88) - - - - - (1.50) - - 
∆FP12 - - - -0.096 - - - - - -0.005 - - 
 - - - (-1.49) - - - - - (-0.084) - - 
∆PO13 - - - - 0.549** 0.476* - - - - 0.258 0.161 
 - - - - (2.01) (1.76) - - - - (0.93) (0.589) 
∆SG13 - - - - - 0.117 - - - - - 0.200** 
 - - - - - (1.36) - - - - - (2.32) 
∆FS13 - - - - - -2.840** - - - - - 0.811 
 - - - - - (-2.23) - - - - - (0.63) 
∆FP13 - - - - - 0.077 - - - - - 0.126** 
 - - - - - (1.37) - - - - - (2.23) 
Constant 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.082** 1.14** -0.033 0.000 0.018 0.040 -0.034 -0.022 -0.040* -0.055** 
 (3.23) (3.73) (3.37) (2.88) (-1.58) (0.007) (0.95) (1.56) (-1.58) (-0.64) (-1.89) (-2.06) 
Obs 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
χ2-test 0.16 1.80 1.34 1.78 4.02** 3.09** 0.002 0.52 0.154 1.99* 0.865 2.68** 
R2 0.001 0.051 0.009 0.049 0.027 0.081 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.054 0.006 0.071 
Adjusted R2 -0.006 0.023 0.002 0.021 0.020 0.055 -0.007 -0.014 -0.006 0.027 -0.001 0.044 
Notes: In the Weighted Least Square Regression (WLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in 
accounts receivables (∆AR) and changes in inventory (∆INV). Independent variable is changes in promoter 
ownership (∆PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and firm 
performance (∆FP). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
Table 6. WLS regression – promoter ownership, accounts payables, and cash conversion cycle 
 
Variables ∆AP12 ∆AP12 ∆AP12 ∆AP13 ∆AP14 ∆AP14 ∆CCC12 ∆CCC12 ∆CCC13 ∆CCC13 ∆CCC14 ∆CCC14 
∆PO11 0.395 0.375 - - - - -1.022** -1.173** - - - - 
 (1.24) (1.15) - - - - (-2.16) (-2.35) - - - - 
∆SG11 - -0.271** - - - - - -0.062 - - - - 
 - (-2.44) - - - - - (-0.37) - - - - 
∆FS11 - -0.364 - - - - - -0.587 - - - - 
 - (-0.68) - - - - - (-0.71) - - - - 
∆FP11 - 0.069 - - - - - -0.129 - - - - 
 - (0.98) - - - - - (-1.19) - - - - 
∆PO12 - - -0.051 -0.259 - - - - -1.252** -1.349** - - 
 - - (-0.15) (-0.73) - - - - (-2.83) (-2.96) - - 
∆SG12 - - - 0.291** - - - - - 0.194 - - 
 - - - (2.47) - - - - - (1.29) - - 
∆FS12 - - - -1.033 - - - - - 2.483 - - 
 - - - (-0.56) - - - - - (1.06) - - 
∆FP12 - - - 0.014 - - - - - 0.005 - - 
 - - - (0.22) - - - - - (0.061) - - 
∆PO13 - - - - -0.012 0.089 - - - - -0.998** -1.137** 
 - - - - (-0.04) (0.33) - - - - (-2.19) (-2.53) 
∆SG13 - - - - - -0.345 - - - - - 0.331 
 - - - - - (-4.01) - - - - - (2.33) 
∆FS13 - - - - - 0.671 - - - - - -4.279** 
 - - - - - (0.53) - - - - - (-2.03) 
∆FP13 - - - - - 0.010 - - - - - 0.07 
 - - - - - (0.17) - - - - - (0.75) 
Constant 0.014 0.073** 0.005 -0.031 0.027 0.047* -0.107** -0.092* -0.028 -0.101** -0.087** -0.053 
 (0.59) (2.21) (0.22) (-0.79) (1.25) (1.75) (-2.94) (-1.81) (-0.90) (-2.00) (-2.50) (-1.21) 
Obs 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
χ2-test 1.54 2.65** 0.021 1.56 0.002 4.13** 4.65** 1.56 7.99** 2.89** 4.81** 3.47** 
R2 0.011 0.074 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.105 0.033 0.045 0.053 0.076 0.032 0.090 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.046 -0.007 0.015 -0.007 0.079 0.026 0.016 0.046 0.050 0.026 0.064 
Notes: In the Weighted Least Square Regression (WLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in 
accounts payables (∆AP) and changes in cash conversion cycle (∆CCC). Independent variable is changes in 
promoter ownership (∆PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and 
firm performance (∆FP). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
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4.4 Relationship between changes in 
promoter ownership and changes in cash 
conversion efficiency 
 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation 
7. Negative relationships between ∆FS13 and 
∆CCE14 indicate that change in firm size decrease 
cash conversion efficiency of Indian production firms. 
Positive relationships between: 
 ∆SG11 and ∆CCE12 and ∆SG13 and ∆CCE14 
indicate that changes in sales growth increase cash 
conversion efficiency of Indian production firms. 
 ∆PO11 and ∆CCE12 and ∆PO13 and ∆CCE14 
indicate that changes in promoter ownership increase 
cash conversion efficiency of Indian production firms. 
 ∆SG12 and ∆CCE13 indicate that changes in 
sales growth increase cash conversion efficiency of 
Indian production firms. 
 
Table 7. WLS Regression – Promoter Ownership and Cash Conversion Efficiency 
 
Variables ∆CCE12 ∆CCE12 ∆CCE13 ∆CCE13 ∆CCE14 ∆CCE14 
∆PO11 1.005** 0.834 - - - - 
 (1.99) (1.57) - - - - 
∆SG11 - -0.125 - - - - 
 - (-0.69) - - - - 
∆FS11 - -0.811 - - - - 
 - (-0.93) - - - - 
∆FP11 - -0.095 - - - - 
 - (-0.83) - - - - 
∆PO12 - - 0.019 -0.153 - - 
 - - (0.04) (-0.31) - - 
∆SG12 - - - 2.78* - - 
 - - - (1.70) - - 
∆FS12 - - - 1.061 - - 
 - - - (0.41) - - 
∆FP12 - - - 0.010 - - 
 - - - (0.12) - - 
∆PO13 - - - - 1.332** 1.159** 
 - - - - (2.44) (2.22) 
∆SG13 - - - - - 0.609*** 
 - - - - - (3.68) 
∆FS13 - - - - - -4.354* 
 - - - - - (1.78) 
∆FP13 - - - - - -0.093 
 - - - - - (-0.86) 
Constant -0.136** -1.03* -0.090** -1.56** -0.017 -0.018 
 (-3.51) (-1.92) (-2.64) (-2.83) (-0.40) (-0.36) 
Obs 151 151 151 151 151 151 
χ2-test 3.97** 1.34 0.002 0.89 5.96** 5.81*** 
R
2
 0.028 0.039 0.000 0.025 0.040 0.141 
Adjusted R
2
 0.021 0.010 -0.007 -0.003 0.033 0.117 
Notes: In the Weighted Least Square Regression (WLS) models, the dependent variable is changes in cash 
conversion efficiency (∆CCE). Independent variable is changes in promoter ownership (∆PO) and control 
variables include changes in sales growth (∆SG), firm size (∆FS), and firm performance (∆FP). ***, ** and * 
imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The present study found that promoter ownership and 
promoter control improve the efficiency of working 
capital management of Indian manufacturing firms. 
Increases in promoter ownership and control reduce 
the cash conversion cycle of the Indian manufacturing 
firms (see Table 2). This may be because the agency 
problem is low when promoters control firms. As 
described in the introductory section, a majority of the 
promoters belong to same families, relatives, and in 
some cases, friends. The agency problem under the 
governance of promoters is low because a majority of 
the shareholders is from the same family and from 
relatives (Schulze et al., 2003). Thus, the findings lend 
some support to agency theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) in that promoter ownership reduces 
cash holdings and cash conversion cycle, and 
increases cash conversion efficiency which is in the 
favor of the firm. The results of this study also lend 
some support to the tradeoff theory of cash holdings.  
 
5.1 Limitations 
 
This study is limited to the sample of Indian 
manufacturing firms. This is a co-relational study that 
investigated the association between promoter 
ownership and the components of working capital 
management efficiency. There is not necessarily a 
causal relationship between the two. The findings of 
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this study could only be generalized to firms similar to 
those that were included in this research. In addition, 
sample size is small. Future study should be conducted 
on different countries to see if the findings support the 
findings of this study in other countries.  
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